The 2004 government takeover of Yukos, Russia's first fully privatized integrated oil company, "heralded a turn away from the liberalism of the 1990s towards an authoritarian corporatism" ("The Khodorkovsky Case" 2009). The takeover was neither a happy marriage between business and power nor a business-preserving bailout. It was preceded by the 2003 arrests of Yukos executives Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who were later sentenced to eight-year prison terms, a legal battle over retroactive tax bills amounting to $34 billion, and an international bankruptcy dispute. In the meantime the company's shareholders' assets were frozen (BBC 2005; "The Khodorkovsky Case" 2009). The case culminated with the government auctioning off the company's major production facility to a private firm for a meager US$9.35 billion. Later, the state-owned corporate giant Rosneft acquired the company.
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The Yukos affair highlights aspects of the business environment that are central to this book. Perhaps the most crucial component of business operations in emerging markets, particularly post-communist economies, has been a general sense of uncertainty that goes beyond the risks that economic agents routinely face worldwide. In established capitalist economies such risks are associated with making decisions contingent on the anticipated actions of numerous economic actors whose circumstances and aspirations are coordinated by the market's "invisible hand" and the government's "visible hand," which provides law and order. In emerging markets, as the Yukos case demonstrates, the government's hand becomes less reliable and predictable. Also, the logic behind spontaneous economic coordination by the invisible hand becomes convoluted because property rights and contract enforcement cannot be taken for granted. Although Yukos is in no way a typical post-communist company, this example Preface xiv clearly demonstrates business's vulnerability vis-à-vis the state, insecure property rights, and feeble laws that are symptomatic of emerging markets.
Although the plight of Yukos and its executives attracted strong international and domestic attention, we often know too little about practices and conditions that structure an everyday environment of an average post-communist firm. Because of much attention to large-scale privatization, corruption scandals, and renationalization, the experience of oligarch firms have skewed our views of post-communist business. Such firms, although of much political and economic importance, are rather atypical examples of the post-communist business. This book is not about oligarch firms like Yukos but rather about everyday firms. Still, the Yukos case helps appreciate the extent of business vulnerability: when one of the largest and most well-governed companies cannot defend itself against the state, an average business has even less of a chance.
The Yukos affair is symptomatic not only of the business environment but also of the patterns of business representation developing in the region. The only Russian public organization that publicly defended Yukos executives and later opposed partitioning of the company was the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), of which Yukos was a member. Shortly after Khodorkovsky's arrest, the RUIE leadership petitioned President Putin to free Khodorkovsky. No liberal, proreform politicians or watchdog organizations joined the RUIE petition. Despite a rift among the RUIE leadership (only six of the twenty-seven board members went on record condemning the arrest), RUIE President Arkadii Volsky strongly criticized the government's handling of the case. In 2004 the office of the procurator general (public prosecutor) accused Volsky of pressuring the court (Netreba 2004). Still, the RUIE turned out to be powerless in defending Yukos. It eventually conceded to the government with regard to Yukos and refrained from criticizing other renationalization moves. Surprisingly, the RUIE's apparent failure to defend one of its members did not preclude the growth of membership and the continuing support from existing members, many of whom still believe that the RUIE remains a significant domestic force and stands by the private sector's interests.
The tale of Yukos and the RUIE points to the contradictory nature of formal organizations uniting business and industrial interests. On the one hand, business associations -voluntary-membership nonprofit organizations of businesses or their owners -appear to be important social institutions. On the other hand, their political influence is limited due to the nature of organizational structure, the diversity of members' interests, and the organizations' often overtly apolitical stance. Although some believe that business associations primarily protect particularistic moneyed interests at the expense of public interest, others cite such associations' socially and economically benign activities (e.g., resisting government encroachment on private business, compensating for underdeveloped mechanisms of economic coordination, and reducing transaction costs). This book demonstrates that although post-communist business associations engage in both kinds of behavior, lobbying for narrowly defined goals has not xvii This book would not have been possible without the outstanding intellectual guidance, kind encouragement, and constructive criticism of the mentors, colleagues, and assistants I was lucky to have over the years of working on this project. I first would like to thank my mentors at The Ohio State University for their advice, professional guidance, and, most importantly, for believing in my potential and stimulating my intellectual development. Professor Timothy Frye was my advisor during the years I spent at Ohio State and remained central to the development of my ideas after both of us left. I benefited tremendously from his insights, experience, and generous commitment to reading multiple drafts of this book.
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